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STUDENT NOTE
CONCLUSIVE PFESUMPTIONS IN WEST VIRGMA

Presumptions, as might be expected, have been appearing and
disappearing throughout the history of evidence. Much confusion
has attended the use of the word, and there has been no less confusion about the kinds of presumptions, be they presumptions of
law, presumptions of fact, conclusive presumptions or whatever
name courts and writers ascribe to them. The conclusive presumption is an especially troublesome creature, some writers denying its existence while others recognize it but devote very little time
to it. It is the purpose here, in a humble way, to look at its use in
this state and to determine if in fact it does exist.
Whenever the term presumption is used, it describes a relationship between one fact or group of facts and another fact or group
of facts.1 It is the assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law
which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group
1 State v. Dodds 54 W. Va. 289, 46 S.E. 228 (1904); State v. Heaton,

28 W. Va. 778 (18838; 1 MonGA_, BAsic

PROBLEMS

OF EVIDENCE § 80 (1954).
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of facts found or otherwise established in the action.2 Call the one
fact, A, and the other, the presumed fact, B. Presumptions are
commonly used in two situations: (1) when fact A is established
in an action, the existence of fact B must be assumed, 3 and (2)
when fact A is established in the action, the existence of fact B
may be inferred by the application of ordinary rules of logic. 4 The
basic fact, or fact A, may be established by the pleadings, by judicial
notice, by stipulation of the parties or by a finding supported by
the evidence.
Generally, courts have treated presumptions in different ways
according to the meaning they place on them and the way in which
they apply them. Mr. Morgan lists the meanings that courts attach
to them in four categories. 5
1. If the court means that when A is established in the action,
the existence of B may be deduced by -the operation of ordinary
rules of reasoning, it sometimes says that the trier of fact may presume the existence of B if it finds A. The presumption is said to be
one of fact, and careful judges and writers insist that the proper term
is "inference" rather than "presumption".
2. If the court means that when A is established, it is for all
purposes in the case the legal equivalent of B, it frequently declares
that the existence of B is conclusively presumed. For example, if it is
established that D is under seven years of age, it is conclusively
presumed that he is incapable of committing a felony. This is merely
a way of expressing the rule of substantive law that a person under
seven years of age cannot be legally convicted of a felony.
8. If the court means that if A is established, the trier of fact
is permitted, but not compelled, to find B, even though A would
not in the opinion of the court form the basis of a deduction that
B exists if the ordinary rules of reasoning in the light of human
experience were used, it is obvious that the trier is being allowed
to give an artificial effect to A. This is the theory upon which, as
some commentators insist, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is based.
They say that it is a justified presumption because the defendant
in the particular situation has peculiar knowledge, or peculiar means
of access to evidence of the pertinent fact. At times a legislature
declares -thatwhen A is established the trier may find B, even though
om RuLE OF EVIDENcE 13.
3 9 WGMORE, Evm cE § 2490 (3d ed. 1940).
4 McCouMncx, EVIDENCE § 308 (1954).
5 Morgan, Foreword,in MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 52 (1942).
2U
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the judicial decisions in the jurisdiction have theretofore declared
that a trier could not justifiably deduce B from the existence of A.
In these situations the right of a party to have the jury make the
inference persists unless and until evidence has been received which
would require a directed verdict of the nonexistence of B.
4. Thayer, Wigmore, the American Law Institute, and commentators generally have argued, and many courts have agreed that
the term "presumption" should be used only to mean that when A
is established in the action, the existence of B must be assumed
unless and until a specified condition is fulfilled. All courts agree
that "presumption" is properly used in this situation, but there is
wide disagreement as to the terms of the condition.
Although courts have treated presumptions in different ways
their reasons for creating them are principally the same. There are
many situations which naturally require courts to declare that when
the basic fact A is found then fact B must be assumed. Although
the reasons are various all presumptions find life in them. 6
1. Some presumptions are created to expedite the trial by making
unnecessary the introduction of evidence upon issues raised by the
pleadings which are not likely to be seriously litigated. So, where
courts put upon the prosecution the burden of persuading the jury
of defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution
has the benefit of a presumption of the defendant's sanity.7
2. Presumptions are created to avoid a procedural impasse
where evidence of the existence or nonexistence of the presumed
fact is lacking. It is now generally held that unexplained absence
for seven years and lack of news of the absentee by those who would
normally have heard from him were he alive raise a presumption
8
of his death.
3. Presumptions are created because of the impossibility of
securing evidence as to the existence or nonexistence of an essential
fact Where a testator and his beneficiary die in a common disaster,
it is impossible to secure evidence tending to show which predeceased the other.9
6 Ray, Presumptionsand the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 83 TExAs L. REv.
588 7(1955).
Wright v. Wright, 78 W. Va. 57, 88 S.E. 606 (1916); Hielt v. Shufl,
36 W.
8 Va. 563, 15 S.E. 146 (1892).
Flesher v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 188 W. Va. 765, 77 S.E.2d 890
(1953).
9W. VA. CODE ch. 42, art. 5, § 1 (Michie 1955).
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4. A large proportion of presumptions are based wholly or
partly on probability. That is, when fact A is proved the existence
of fact B is so probable that courts may assume its truth. Where
a letter bearing the correct address and properly stamped is mailed,
then it may be assumed that it was received because of the great
probability that such was the case. 10
5. Presumptions are created to require the party who has
peculiar means of access to the facts to first produce evidence of
them. For example, where freight is delivered in good order to
an initial carrier and is delivered in bad order to the consignee by
the terminal carrier, although it may have been transported over
the lines of several connecting carriers, there is a presumption that
the damage was done by the terminal carrier. As between the
carriers and the consignee, the last carrier has peculiar means of
access to the evidence of the facts."
6. Where in the opinion of the court or legislature the existence
of the basic fact makes socially desirable the legal results which will
follow if the presumed fact also exists, the accomplishment of the desired end may be facilitated by the creation of a presumption. For
example, the presumption of possession or12 use of realty for a long
period of time is evidence of a lost grant.
Many presumptions rest upon a combination of two or more
of these reasons in that when the basic fact is found to exist, the
assumed fact is highly probable; it may be almost impossible to
produce competent and convincing evidence; and the assumed fact
may be socially desirable.1 3
The effect that courts have given to the use of presumptions is
still another thing. At least eight different views have been expressed
in judicial opinions. 14 First, the compulsory assumption of the
presumed fact disappears whenever evidence has been introduced
which would justify a jury in finding the nonexistence of the presumed fact. Whether the judge or jury believes or disbelieves the
evidence is immaterial. The issue is now to be determined disregarding the presumption completely.' 3 Second, the assumption
'o Antonowich v. Home Life Ins. Co., 116 W. Va. 155, 179 S.E. 601
(1935); W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 2 (Michie 1955).
11 Mulroy v. Co-operative Transit Co., 95 S.E.2d 63 (W. Va. 1956).
12W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 2,

§ 1 (Michie 1955).

13 Dwight v. Hazlett, 107 W. Va. 192, 147 S.E. 877 (1929); W. VA. CODE
ch. 48, art. 2, § 2 (Michie 1955).
14 1 MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEmS OF EVIDENCE § 30 (1957).
'5

Dwight v. Hazlett, supra note 13.
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vanishes upon the introduction of such evidence unless the jury
positively disbelieves the evidence. Third, the assumption disappears only if the jury positively believes the evidence. Fourth, the
assumption continues until the introduction of "substantial" evidence
of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. The cases do not clearly
show what is meant by "substantial", but it certainly means more
than evidence which would merely justify a finding. Fifth, the
assumption continues until the evidence convinces the jury that
the nonexistence of the presumed fact is at least as probable as its
existence. It is sometimes said that the evidence must balance the
presumption. Sixth, the assumption continues until the evidence
convinces the jury that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is
more probable than its existence. In other words, the presumption
puts upon the party denying the presumed fact the burden of persuasion as well as the burden of producing evidence to rebut the
presumption. Seventh, where a presumption is created because the
opposing party has peculiar knowledge concerning facts for determining the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact, the assumption persists until the jury is convinced that facts are shown
from which reasonable minds could find against the existence of
the presumed fact. Eighth, the presumption operates as evidence
of the existence of the presumed fact, and this is so regardless of
the evidence of its existence.
Although the first, third and seventh effects have found rare
application, the others considered have been applied often according
to the type of presumption with which the courts have dealt. In
most cases it is difficult to distinguish which type of presumption
is being applied and just what effect the court applying it is giving
to it. In this respect most courts have applied a rule to fit the particular case instead of developing a rule of presumptions that will
16
apply generally with some certainty.
It is held in this state that presumptions, whether they are
presumptions of law or fact, are not evidence of a fact, but purely
a conclusion, having no probative force, and are designed only to
sustain the burden of proof until evidence is introduced tending
to overcome the presumption.1 7 It does not shift the burden of
proof, and with the introduction of evidence it loses entirely its
10 Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REv. 324

(1952).

17 Laphew v. Consolidated Bus Lines, 133 W. Va. 291, 55 S.E.2d 881
(1949); Jenkins v. Spitler, 120 W. Va. 514, 199 S.E. 368 (1938).
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legal force. Only the basic facts remain to be considered by the
trier along with the other evidence.18 It is sometimes said, and
rightly so, that the presumption shifts the burden of going forward
with the evidence but does not shift the burden of persuasion. 19
The West Virginia court has held that there are two kinds of
presumptions, legal and artificial, or natural.20 The legal and artificial presumption is commonly called a presumption of law, and
derives from the law a technical or artificial operation and effect
beyond mere natural tendency to produce belief and operates without applying the process of reasoning on which it is founded to
the circumstances of the particular case. The natural presumptions,
or more commonly called presumptions of fact, operate by their
own efficacy and are inferred by the application of ordinary rules
of logic. 2 ' The presumption of fact may be rebutted by the introduction of evidence of facts to the contrary, if such facts are established in the action.92 On -the other hand, a presumption of law
in this state is irrebuttable.2 3 That is, once the basic fact has been
established in the action, the law requires that the assumed fact
be taken as true, and the party resisting the presumption may not
introduce evidence to rebut it. This view is inconsistent with the
general rule that presumptions of law may be either rebuttable or
conclusive. Generally, a presumption of law is one in which the
law requires that a certain assumed fact must be drawn from the
existence of a certain established fact in the absence of direct evidence on the matter. If it is rebuttable, then the opposing party
must establish facts which show the nonexistence of the presumed
fact, and if this is done the presumption disappears and the trier
is left with the evidence otherwise established in the action. If the
presumption of law is conclusive, then the law still requires that a
certain fact be assumed from the existence of a certain established
fact, but -theparty opposing the assumption is precluded from introducing any evidence to rebut the assumed fact.
The distinguishing feature between a presumption of law and
a presumption of fact is that in the former the law requires that
18 1 JoNEs,
19
20

TwH=s,

EVIDENCE § 80

PREwnmuNY

(2d ed. 1952).

TYATisE ON EvIDENCE

§ 313 (1898).

Goshorn v. Snodgrass, 17 W. Va. 717 (1881).
Nat Bank v. Tri-State Equip. Co., 108 W. Va. 686, 152 S.E. 635
(1930);
22 Sadler v. Kennedy, 11 W. Va. 187 (1877).
Dwight v. Hazlett, 107 W. Va. 192, 147 S.E. 877 (1929); Hunt v. Hunt,
91 W. Va. 685, 114 S.E. 283 (1922); Hamilton v. Steele, 22 W. Va. 348 (1883).
23 State v. Toley, 131 W. Va. 326 47 S.E.2d 40 (1948); Holly v. Purity
Baking Co., 128 W. Va. 531, 37 S.E.2d 729 (1946).
21 First
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the trier assume the existence of a presumed fact, while in the
latter the trier is under no duty created by a rule of law to assume
the presumed fact. The presumption of fact, as Mr. Morgan contends, may more properly be called an "inference" rather than a
"presumption".2 4

Many courts and writers deny the existence of such a thing as
a conclusive presumption. As Wigmore has stated,
"In strictness, there cannot be such a thing as a 'conclusive presumption'. Whenever from one fact another is conclusively presumed, in the sense that the opponent is absolutely precluded
from showing by any evidence that the second fact does not
exist, the rule really provides that, where the first fact is shown
to exist, the second facts existence is wholly immaterial for
the purpose of the proponent's case; aid to provide this is to
make a rule of substantive law, and not a rule apportioning the
burden of persuading as to certain propositions or varying the
duty of coming forward with evidence. The term has no place
in the principles of evidence and should be discarded."2 5
This view seems to carry much weight because it is clear that when
a court declares that a presumption is irrebuttable it is either creating a rule of substantive law or stating a previously created rule
of substantive law. When it declares that the burden is on a party
to prove a material fact, his failure, without proper excuse, to produce an important witness to the fact, raises the conclusive presumption that such witness could not prove it,2 6 the court is merely
stating the rule of substantive law that a party will not be aided
by facts which he cannot prove by witnesses, when such party has
that burden of proof. Also when the court states that the failure
of a party to present a fact necessary to his case, when to offer that
fact in evidence is within the power of such party, must be taken
as conclusive that such fact does not exist2 7 is to state the rule of
substantive law that a party must, if it is within his power to do
so, introduce any fact necessary to his case in order that he may rely
on such fact. It may be said that each time a fact is conclusively
presumed the same fact in the particular circumstance is a rule of
substantive law.2 8
24 1 MoRGAN, BAslc PRoBLEMS OF EVIDENCE § 83 (1957).
25 9 WiGmomx, EVImENCE § 2492. It may well be urged

that all of these
so-called conclusive presumptions of law be more properly described as substantive
26 rules of law. 1 JoNEs, EvmEN E § 23.
Vandervort v. Fouse, 52 W. Va. 214, 43 S.E. 112 (1902).
27
28 Despard v. Pearcy, 65 W. Va. 140, 63 S.E. 871 (1909).
Moundsville, B. &W. Ry.v. Wilson, 52 W. Va. 647,44 S.E. 169 (1902);
Pusey v. Gardner, 21 W. Va. 460 (1888).
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As stated before, presumptions are not evidence of a fact, but this
statement loses some of its force when one considers it in the light
of a conclusive presumption. If the court says that if the basic fact,
A, is established in the action then the presumed fact, B, must be
conclusively presumed, then the presumed fact, B, does in fact
29
become evidence of the fact and the court will so instruct the jury.
If this view is taken we return to the situation where there is no
conclusive presumption but rather a rule of substantive law. The
rule cannot be contradicted by evidence but rather rests on grounds
of policy so compelling in character as to override the generally
fundamental requirement of law that fact questions must be resolved according to proof. It therefore seems to be acceptable for
the court to use the term "conclusive presumption" so long as it is
clearly understood that it is really creating or preserving a rule of
substantive law.
In conclusion, it is suggested that some basic rules with respect
to the use of presumptions, as well as inferences should be formulated. The following rules are respectfully submitted with full
knowledge that all situations are unique and the task of applying
a set rule to all circumstances will prove to be an impossible task
even though it may be a very desirable end.
1. The presumption of fact should henceforth be termed an
"inference" in all situations in which the court means that if the
basic fact, A, is established in the action, the existence of the
assumed fact, B, may be deduced by the operation of ordinary rules
of reasoning, in other words, where the court says that the trier of
fact may presume the existence of B if it finds A. Such "inference"
should remain until it is met and overcome by evidence which
would justify a jury in finding the nonexistence of the inferred fact.
The issue should then be determined disregarding the "inference"
completely.
2. The term "presumption of law" should henceforth be used
only to mean that when the basic fact, A, is established in the action,
the existence of B must be assumed. Such "presumption of law"
should remain until the evidence to the contrary convinces the jury
that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is at least as probable as
its existence, or where the presumption is created because the
opposing party has peculiar knowledge concerning facts determining
the existence or nonexistence of the presumption, the assumption
29 State v. Reppert, 182

W. Va. 675, 52 S.E.2d 820 (1949).
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should persist until the jury are convinced that facts are shown
from which reasonable minds could find against the existence of
the presumed facts. If the assumed fact is rebutted then it should,
just as in the case of an "inference, disappear. The "presumption"
should function only as a procedural ,device of going forward with
the evidence which would dictate a decision only where there is an
entire lack of competent evidence to contradict it, but the inoment
substantial, countervailing evidence appears from any source, the
presumption should cease to have any function. The presumption
should merely shift the burden of going forward with the evidence
but should not shift the burden of persuasion.
3. The court should in every case avoid the use of the term
"conclusive presumption". If the end accomplished is no more than
to declare a rule of substantive law, which is beyond the province
of the trier, then it should not be reached through the fiction of
presumption, but rather by way of a positive statement by the court
declaring or preserving a substantive common law rule.
J. L. R.
CASE COMMENTS
CoNsTroNAL LAW-DUE PRocEss-EvmENcE OF PmoR CONvicnoN.-D was convicted of first degree murder in the state court

and sentenced to death. Under Pennsylvania law, the jury has the
duty of determining the penalty when they find a defendant guilty
of first degree murder. The court allowed the admission of evidence of a prior conviction, instructing the jury that such evidence was to be used solely for the purpose of assessing the penalty.
This evidence was allowed before the jury determined the guilt or
innocence of D. D contends that the introduction of such evidence
before the verdict on the theory that the jury will disregard this
knowledge in determining his guilt, and yet use it later in determining his penalty is a denial of due process under the fourteenth
amendment. Held, that the fourteenth amendment guarantees no
particular form of procedure in state criminal trials, and the states
should have the widest latitude in administering their own systems
of justice; consequently, Pennsylvania procedure, permitting the
introduction of prior convictions for the sole purpose of enabling the
jury to assess the proper penalty, did not deprive D of due process
of law. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Price, 258 F.2d 918 (3d

Cir. 1958).
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